In seeking to understand how future societies will be affected by climate change we cannot simply assume they will be identical to those of today, because climate and societies are both dynamic. Here we propose that the concept of demographic metabolism and the associated methods of multidimensional population projections provide an effective analytical toolbox to forecast important aspects of societal change that affect adaptive capacity. We present an example of how the changing educational composition of future populations can influence societies' adaptive capacity. Multi-dimensional population projections form the human core of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways scenarios, and knowledge and analytical tools from demography have great value in assessing the likely implications of climate change on future human well-being.
generating the scenarios of changing population size and composition by age, gender and level of educational attainment. This has been designed to capture key dimensions of future adaptive capacity. We first address the temporal nature of human-climate interactions and describe the toolbox of multidimensional population dynamics and the concept of demographic metabolism that translates them into measurable social change. We then provide an example of educational attainment (as one important population characteristic) and its role in enhancing adaptive capacity. We conclude with illustrations of numerical applications of the approach and policy recommendations.
It is important to clarify right at the beginning that in this Perspective we will not address all possible consequences of climate change but only those that we consider most dangerous to human well-being. These include all threats to human life (death is irreversible), human health (in particular serious and lasting disability) and basic human subsistence (for example, the risk of absolute poverty which causes higher risk of death and disability). Economic losses that affect wealthy people but fall short of pushing them into poverty will not be considered in this analysis since they are caused by different mechanisms. For example, the destruction of expensive houses by storms that rich people built in highly exposed coastal locations is not considered in our approach to studying adaptive capacities. Moreover, there is no consistent measure of total economic losses 6 and the evidence on a negative impact of natural disasters, especially on indirect loss, remains inconclusive 7 . For this reason, our arguments do not relate adaptive capacity to potential economic loss. Instead they relate primarily to loss of life, health and basic livelihood.
Temporal associations between society and global climate
[FIGURE 1: ABOUT HERE] Figure 1 illustrates the circular link between the human population including its size and structure, socioeconomic development and the global climate system. The two systems interact dynamically with a complex lag structure both on the mitigation and adaptation sides of the circle.
The left side of the diagram shows that humans have been causing changes to the climate system mostly through the burning of fossil fuels and land use change. This is a cumulative process that has been going on at least for a century and will likely continue over the coming decades.
It is triggered by both the growing number of humans and increasing per person impacts, which in turn can be decomposed into income (consumption) and technology effects working in opposite directions. A decomposition of these effects is sometimes discussed in terms of the socalled I=PAT equation (Impact = Population x Affluence x Technology) which has been introduced by Ehrlich and Holdren 8 and also by Kaya 9 . It can be quantified in terms of the identity CO2 = (population) x (GDP per capita) x (energy per unit of GDP) x (CO2 per unit of energy use). Several studies have tried to assess the relative impacts of the three factors which turned out to be rather problematic because the three factors are not independent. Technology and affluence work in opposite directions and other factors such as household size were shown to be equally relevant 10, 11 . There is however no doubt that in a synergistic way, all these human activities together are responsible for the increased concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere contributing to global warming.
On the right hand side of Fig. 1 , we see the impacts of the changed climate at time t + x on the human population. The changes in the climate can directly affect human health and mortality (due to natural disasters and changes in the disease environment), and impact on human livelihoods as they cascade through the entire economic production chain. In the context of our focus on basic subsistence, the effects on farming through changing agricultural productivity especially in the context of subsistence farming in less developed countries are of particular relevance. These impacts may also trigger migration flows either within countries or to other countries. Flooding and sea level rise can also directly drive populations out of certain territories.
The actual push factors for out-migration will likely result from a complex interplay between environmental and economic reasons and political and security conditions.
The literature on possible climate change induced international migration abounds and tends to be rather speculative in nature 12 . A comprehensive assessment of the scientific evidence concludes that while one response to environmental change is to migrate (reflected on the right of Fig. 1 ) 13 , populations who experience the impacts of environmental change may see a reduction in the very capital required to enable a move. In fact, millions of people will be unable to move away from locations where they are vulnerable to environmental change. If climatedriven migration does occur, it will likely be short distance, within national borders 14 . The net result of this on international migration thus is quite uncertain. additionally, there is and will be substantial heterogeneity within populations. Population heterogeneity is captured by observable individual characteristics such as age, gender, education, income, and place of residence ,which determine a population's capacity to adapt 15 .
In other words, similar to the risk of disease, people living in the same community or even within the same household are likely to have differential vulnerability depending on their characteristics. Moreover, the composition of the population with respect to these characteristics is not static but is changing over time.
When addressing societies' future adaptive capacities, we also need to take account of the complex interactions between human capital (knowledge and skills embodied in individuals)
and social capital (institutions, regulations and public policies such as zoning that structure the individual adaptive decisions). While social capital facilitates the formation of human capital 16 , it is enhanced human capital that will produce stronger social capital. Good institutions do not fall from heaven nor can they be imposed by other powers: they have to evolve from an increasingly self-empowered population. There is evidence on how increasing levels of education in a population help improve the quality of institutions and bring about democratic decision making processes through increasing civic and political participation [17] [18] [19] . While it is close to impossible to forecast the quality of specific institutions, there are tools to forecast societies level of aggregate human capital, which is a necessary prerequisite for the development of such institutions. Indeed, there is a strong statistical association with the causality clearly going from better education (comes years before) to higher adult human capital with a decadal-scale lag time and, subsequently, better institutions. In this respect, human capital, which is forecastable, can be treated as a proxy of institutional capacity, which is more difficult to forecast directly. Knowing the future composition of the population with its associated capacities will thus assist policy planning including those related to climate change.
Population dynamics and demographic metabolism
In the following, we present a new approach for modelling and forecasting socioeconomic change for decades into the future based on the changing composition of populations by relevant characteristics (for example, age, gender, level of education, and other stable individual characteristics) that matter for future adaptive capacity both at individual and societal levels.
Unlike economic forecasts and predictions of human behaviour that are rather volatile and within a few years can move in totally unexpected directions, demographic forecasts are remarkably inert. Population forecasting is reliable over decades because it refers to the slowly changing stocks of people with life expectancies of well above half a century and many characteristics established at young age (for example, education) that remain unchanged over the life course.
While the tool is demographic in its approach and origin, the applicability goes far beyond what are conventionally thought to be demographic questions. To our knowledge, this is the only existing tool for relevant quantitative social forecasting at a timescale that is applicable for climate change-related analyses.
Demography studies the changing size and composition of populations. As this scientific discipline developed out of what used to be called 'political arithmetic', there has been a long tradition of forecasting future population trends for all kinds of government policies ranging from military to health and education systems. Originally, the approach was to consider the population as homogeneous and projection was simply done by applying an assumed growth rate to a given initial population size. Although birth and death rates vary strongly with age, under conditions of rather stable age structures, this was a useful approximation and it is still widely used, for example, in animal demography. For human populations, however, age structures in Europe became irregular due to fertility declines and the strong fluctuations in births and deaths associated with World War I, the Spanish Flu and the Great Depression. another (such as from secondary to tertiary education). Capturing these movements between different sub-categories of each cohort through a set of age-and gender-specific transition probabilities allows for the application of the powerful methods of multi-dimensional mathematical demography mentioned above 25, 26 . Hence, the model of demographic metabolism can describe and forecast under certain assumptions how societies change as a consequence of the changing composition of their members with respect to certain relevant and measureable characteristics.
[ For the pyramid in 1990, we clearly see that the entire education pattern has essentially moved up the age pyramid by 20 years. By then, the better educated younger cohorts had reached the main working ages which also was a factor driving the rapid economic growth of that time 27 .
By 2010 the education structure had moved up another 20 years and as a consequence of improved female education, birth rates strongly declined. This mechanism of cohorts moving up can be extended into the future as the pyramid for 2030 shows. By then, even the elderly in Korea will have some education and the uneducated population will essentially disappear.
This model does not only hold for the changing educational composition. It can also be applied to other relevant characteristics that tend to be persistent along cohort lines. For instance, the entry of new generations who have grown up being exposed to environmental education and post-materialistic values 28 can influence environmental attitudes and environmental behaviour at the societal level. The concept of demographic metabolism has already been applied to modelling and forecasting the changing prevalence of attitudes towards gender roles 29, 30 , homosexuality 31 and European identity 32, 33 where younger and older birth cohorts differ mainly because younger generations were socialized in different social environments.
There are also relevant cohort effects with respect to health. Owing to social and economic development over the second half of the twentieth century, there is strong evidence showing that younger cohorts, especially those born after 1960 are healthier than the older ones at any given age. This pattern is particularly discernible in old age both for physical capability and cognitive function [34] [35] [36] . Although the elderly are particularly vulnerable to certain weather extremes such as heat waves and population ageing is expected to amplify the risks associated with heatwaves 37 , the process of demographic metabolism suggests that older people in the future will not only be better educated but will likely be healthier and have better cognitive function than those of today. This implies that the healthier and better informed subsequent cohorts will be able to cope better with the health challenges associated with climate change.
The central role of the changing composition of human populations in socioeconomic development thus has significant implications for the ability to cope with the changing climate.
In fact, adaptation practices have been categorized along different dimensions such as by spatial scale, sector, type of action, climatic zone, baseline development level and actor 38 . Furthermore, adaptations involve anticipatory and reactive actions and include adaptation to short-term weather variability and extreme events and to longer-term climate change including sea-level rise. While heterogeneity in the populations' characteristics of today determine coping responses to current weather variability, anticipating the future population composition through the process of demographic metabolism allows for forecasting societies' capacity to adapt to climate change in the longer-term. For instance, changing educational composition in the population is highly relevant to societies' adaptive capacity as explained below.
Education changes our behaviour and reduces vulnerability
Regarding how precisely education contributes to vulnerability reduction, we build the argument upon a well-established causal link between education and health [39] [40] [41] [42] Furthermore, education indirectly reduces vulnerability through mediating factors such as improved socioeconomic status and social capital. The increased income, for instance, allows people with higher levels of education to make not only the right but also costly strategic investments to reduce vulnerability. With greater social capital and larger social networks 53, 54 , the more educated also have better access to information and social support which facilitate coping responses and undertaking of adaptation measures. Through these direct and indirect mechanisms, there is sufficient ground to assume that education plays a role in reducing vulnerability and enhancing adaptive capacity.
A cautionary note is required on the interplay of the effects of education and income on vulnerability. There is a widespread view that income or GDP per capita is the most important aspect of socio-economic development and also that it is directly related to vulnerability and adaptive capacity. Many empirical studies indeed find an association between the two [55] [56] [57] . The alternative hypothesis, however, is that the cognitive enhancement associated with education is the common cause of both higher income and economic growth 27, 58, 59 and lower vulnerability.
The association between income and vulnerability thus is spurious. Testing these contradictory hypotheses is beyond the scope of this Perspective. There is however evidence based on a study of disaster-related mortality in 167 countries over the period 1970-2010 confirming that female education is the most significant factor resulting in fewer deaths from climate-related disasters after controlling for the effect of income 60 . Most extant studies on human loss from climate hazards nevertheless commonly consider either only GDP [55] [56] [57] or a composite indicator such as Human Development Index 61 . In fact, when the latter is decomposed into its three elements (income, education and health) 62 , the results show that countries with higher level of education on average did experience lower disaster mortality while income did not play a significant role 60 .
In this context, it is also enlightening to look at the rich body of literature studying child mortality as an aspect of vulnerability. Multivariate (controlling for many relevant factors) and multi-level (stratified by household, community, national level) studies have clearly come to the conclusion that for child survival, mothers' education matters more than household wealth as measured by various indicators 63, 64 . Another series of studies has tried to explicitly test the importance of education with respect to disaster vulnerability after controlling for income and vice versa, asking what matters more, income or education? Generally, the result was that for vulnerability, mind matters more than money 62, [65] [66] [67] [68] .
With all this evidence at the micro level, it is not surprising that the vulnerability reducing role Likewise, since education facilitates decision making related to disaster risk reduction measures such as construction practices and location decisions, damages to residential property and economic losses are found to be lower in communities and countries with higher mean year of schooling or higher literacy rate 65, 77, 78 . Furthermore, with better access to loans and credits as well as larger assets and social networks which provide a wider portfolio for coping strategies, households or communities with higher level of education on average are better able to maintain their welfare and level of consumption after being affected by disaster shocks [79] [80] [81] [82] [83] .
With respect to adaptation to the changing climate, education is indeed highly relevant since individuals with higher level of education are also more likely to have better awareness of climate risk 84 . Given that climate change is a relatively new form of risk and a rather sophisticated scientific subject, education facilitates the understanding of new ideas and concepts related to climate variability. Accordingly, a wide range of studies reported a higher likelihood of carrying out adaptation actions such as changing crop types, planting and harvesting dates, methods of farming and using improved type of seed among better educated households [85] [86] [87] . Education also increases options to diversify livelihood and sources of income when facing climate pressure 88 . For instance, migration as an adaptation strategy to cope with livelihood disruptions due to environmental change often involve more educated members 89 .
With the focus of this review on "dangerous" climate change, given the consistent evidence on the protective role of education in reducing disaster vulnerability 69 , we can conclude that better 
Scenarios of future adaptive capacity
The qualitative narratives of the SSPs describe alternative future worlds with respect to socioeconomic development that matters for both mitigation and adaptation challenges. These narratives have been translated into consistent quantitative scenarios covering future trends in areas ranging from population and education 91 , to GDP growth 92 , urbanization 93 , energy and land use. Here we will only focus on what has been termed "the human core of the SSPs" 94 because it directly addresses the future of human beings, including their changing numbers and regional distributions as well as their health and empowerment through education.
The calibration of the SSPs was carried out in tandem with a major new effort to summarize the international state of the art with respect to the drivers of future fertility, mortality, migration and education trends. Over 550 international population experts participated in an attempt to assess alternative substantive arguments that pertain to future demographic trends. The results were subsequently translated into alternative demographic assumptions for all countries of the world until 2060 95 . The specifications of these demographic scenarios followed the general narratives of the SSPs 94 . More specifically, the medium scenario of these new expert argument based projections -which is considered the most likely in terms of future fertility, mortality, migration, and education trends -was set to be identical with SSP2 which reflects a "middle of the road" scenario.
[FIGURE 3: ABOUT HERE] Fig. 3 shows the global population and education trajectories for the three SSPs. The scenario story lines in SSP1 envisage a rapidly developing world with more education, lower mortality, and a more rapid fertility decline in countries with high fertility. For today's rich OECD countries this scenario, based on economic prosperity, assumes medium fertility as couples are likely to be better able to realize their childbearing aspirations. SSP3, in contrast, assumes increasing global inequality in the context of social and economic stagnation leading to stagnant school enrolment rates and retarded demographic transition. For the rich OECD countries, the picture is different with adverse economic conditions assumed to result in low fertility. As Fig.   3 illustrates, by 2050 SSP1 and SSP3 already differ greatly in terms of resulting population size and education structures. Total population size will differ by as much as 1.5 billion over the coming four decades (8.5 billion for SSP1 and 10.0 billion for SSP3 in 2050). Given the very different educational compositions of the world population, it is indeed plausible to assume that these scenarios refer to very different future levels of human well-being. By the end of the century, SSP1 depicts a world of less than 7 billion people with a relatively well-educated and therefore healthy and wealthy population, who will be better able to cope with the consequences of already unavoidable climate change. In contrast, SSP3 shows a world of almost 13 billion people who are less educated, less healthy and less wealthy making them more likely to be much more vulnerable to environmental change.
These differences in total population size are mainly due to a different educational composition for women of reproductive age because fertility rates differ by level of education, with more educated women in developing countries wanting and having better means to actually have fewer births. Lutz and KC 20 recently showed that by 2050, different education scenarios alone result in a difference of about one billion. The SSPs also alter the levels of education-specific fertility and thus produce an even larger inter-scenario difference. As can be expected, the middle-of-the road SSP2 scenario which essentially assumes a continuation of current trends (as they look most likely from today's perspective) results in an intermediate picture with the world population reaching a peak of around 9.4 billion during the second half of this century, followed by a slight decline to 9 billion by the end of the century.
A recent study of disaster fatalities translated estimated determinants of disaster vulnerability including education to the SSP1 and SSP3 scenarios for the rest of the century 60 . It was shown that due to the educational expansion under the rapid social development path in SSP1, disaster mortality will be much lower -even in the case of increasing climate related hazard -than in the SSP3 scenario where underinvestment in education leads to high population growth and heightened vulnerability. . Likewise, in certain hazard events such as tsunami where physiology plays a key role in survivorship, women, children aged<5 and older persons aged>70 years had a clear mortality disadvantage 104 . Mortality risk from flood events, on the other hand, is higher for males than for females 105, 106 . Such demographic differential vulnerability needs to be taken into account in projections of climate change vulnerability and adaptive capacity. The above described SSPs offer a valid way for explicitly incorporating these aspects into assessments of future adaptive capacity.
Discussion and policy implications
In conclusion, this Perspective shows that the model of demographic metabolism can be used to meaningfully produce forecasts of human and associated socio-economic capabilities for several decades into the future. This long time horizon is very different from economic or technological forecasts which have much higher uncertainty, even in the shorter term. The reason for the longer time horizon of the demographic metabolism model lies in the fact that the human life span is now seven to eight decades in most countries. Given that many relevant characteristics of people (such as educational attainment and basic attitudes) are formed at young ages and tend to be stable over the rest of the life course, we are able to predict adaptive capacities associated with these characteristics for many decades ahead. Taking aggregate future human capital projected in this way as a proxy for future socio-economic and institutional capacity, the demographic metabolism model thus offers a meaningful way to quantitatively forecast societies' future adaptive capacity to climate change. This offers the possibility for analyses that actually match future climate conditions with future socio-economic conditions, thus avoiding the misleading assumption that the climate of the future will meet the societies of today. This is an essential prerequisite for trying to assess how dangerous climate change will be for future human well-being. 95 and for the scenarios 91 .
